CENTCOMfocus

Test.

2011-04-01T12:02:00.001-04:00

Just a quick droid test.

The Strong Horse

2010-04-21T13:54:00.001-04:00

It has been a good week for beleaguered Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki. And given my recent comments about Iraq in this space--- he needed it. Over the last month he’s lost his reelection campaign (by a whisker), had the US tell him “yes, you lost,” act like a petulant (yet dictatorial) child, and had Baghdad explode around him.

Well, he needed some good news--- and he got it. First, at a moment when he desperately needed something to strengthen his position, Iraqi (and American, I guess) forces whacked the top two al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leaders in what sounds like a pretty cool raid. Not only did they get these two terrorists, but reports also claim that Iraqi forces managed to score some pretty interesting intelligence. Laptops and other documents appear to be a treasure of information and even indicate that the AQI folks were in pretty good contact with Osama bin Laden.

Then, mere hours after Maliki announced that his forces had disposed of the AQI leadership, Maliki also received word that he was getting his sought after vote recount for the Baghdad area. Of course, this may well contribute to the horrible instability already rocking Baghdad, but—hell, it’s good for Maliki, so…

Tom Friedman recently wrote about how political victory breeds political power. He even quoted Osama bin Laden’s famous “if people see a weak horse next to a strong horse—of course they prefer the strong horse” phrase.

Maliki has had a few victories this week… let’s see if it breeds another term in power.

That's great-- just great.

2010-04-16T08:53:00.000-04:00

As if the Middle East isn’t blowing up as it is, we hear this week that the Syrians may have shipped a few SCUD missiles to their pals at Hezbollah Inc. This has the Israelis in a tizzy, the American’s “concerned,” the Jordanians worrying about war, the UN embarrassed, and Hezbollah, well--- they’re doing just fine.

Of course, the Syrians are denying all this, and state that Israel’s claims are unverified (actually, the claims are unverified, as far as the major news outlets know—Israel is yet to make any hard data public) and that Israel is really trying to set the context for an attack on Syria. Of course, Syria’s denials appear a little silly in light of the fact that a spokesman for Hezbollah excitedly noted that they were in possession of SCUDS --- and the fact that Syria apparently trained Hezbollah folks to use SCUDS late last year, but, yeah, sure, Jewish conspiracy seems more plausible, why not. (If only there was an emoticon for sarcasm)

At this point, we really don’t know much more about the situation that what news reports suggest—which currently is simply that the Israeli’s are making an accusation, and the Syians are denying.

However, what we do know is that if the Syrians did ship a few SCUDS into Lebanon, it might be a game changer. To date Hezbollah hasn’t had much to seriously threaten Israel with. Sure, they have their Katyusha rockets, but those rockets only have a range of about 20 miles, are not terribly accurate, and can’t handle a serious warhead.

Certainly, a good ol’ fashioned SCUD is quite the contrast. At the moment, we don’t know which kind of SCUD Syria has supposedly shipped; however, one Israeli official suggested it was a SCUD-D, which is apparently highly accurate with a long range. Some reports even suggest that such a weapon would put the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona within range.

All of this begs the question… why?

Why would Syria want to ship these kinds of weapons to proxy? Why would they want to do it now, of all times, as the US is getting ready to nominate an Ambassador to Syria for the first time since 2005?

On the other hand, if Syria is being honest and hasn’t sent SCUDS to Hezbollah, why on YHWH’s green earth would the Israelis fabricate a story such as this?

Admittedly, the answers to these questions are still a bit hazy.

The Israelis (specifically, Israeli President Shimon Peres) accuse the Syrians of wanting to threaten Israel (i.e. we’re not talking “defensive” SCUDS, --- are we ever?).
The Syrians claim that the Israelis are fabricating a story because they want a pretext to attack Syria. (I’m not sure why Israel would need to set a context for such an attack, they seem pretty amenable to just attacking when they deem it necessary).

Keep an eye on this situation…. If we know anything about the actors involved, we could go from shouting to shooting at the drop of a hat (well, -- at the drop of a yarmulke or turban, in this case).

Who is this Guy?

2010-03-16T13:39:00.001-04:00

By all accounts, incumbent Iraqi premier Nouri al-Maliki is heading for a second term as Prime Minister (PM). Al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition is running strong in early vote counts and seems likely to edge out former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s al-Iraqiyya party.

In a span of 3-4 years, al-Maliki has gone from an obscure party spokesman and deputy of then PM Ibrahim al-Jaafari to one of the, if not the, most powerful figures in Iraq. Clearly Al-Maliki’s position in Iraqi politics means that US success in the country is closely tied to his success leading his embattled nation. If al-Maliki fails, any gains made by the US over the last 7 years (OK, maybe 3 year, or 2…) will wither on the vine.

Given Al Maliki’s importance, one might suspect that US (or at least western) analysts have a strong sense of the man. Not so.

Several years and a (likely) reelection later, Nouri al-Maliki remains something of a mystery. His actions as PM are well documented, but the essence of the man---- how and what he thinks--- is as shrouded as ever (interestingly, President Bush never got a good look into his soul!).

This blog post will briefly examine just who al-Maliki is.

In 2006, when al-Maliki first emerged as a compromise PM, he was so little known in both the region and the world that there was some confusion about what exactly his name was (Jawad? Nouri?). His out of the blue candidacy sent western journalists scrambling. As a result, initial profiles on al-Maliki were conflicting, to say the least. The New York Times indicated that al-Maliki was direct, outspoken, and inflexible. Similarly, Salon reported that he was likely a sectarian who was supportive of policies that would target Sunnis.

On the other hand, USA Today fired off a piece in which a prominent Sunni politician indicated that al-Maliki was more practical and flexible than his predecessor. Along these lines, the Washington Post and the BBC both published reports indicating that al-Maliki was a fairly reasonable person and an Arab nationalist.

Clearly, when al-Maliki was first introduced to the world, he was an unknown commodity. The picture of al-Maliki has not become much more clear during his first term as PM.

Some suspected that concerns about al-Maliki's supposed sectarian streak were laid to rest when he ordered Iraqi forces (with American backup) to attack Shiite militias in the southern Iraqi port city of Basra. Yet, he has also failed to integrate the Sunni "Sons of Iraq" into the police and military forces with any haste. To further muddy the waters, al-Maliki has recently supported an election ban on some supposed Baath party members----- while almost simultaneously reinstating 20,000 army officers who served under Saddam Hussein.

Seriously--- who is this guy?

A recent Time Magazine article likely offers the best perspective on al-Maliki's nature. Time suggests that al-Maliki is a "chameleon." The report quotes one western official suggesting that "...every six months we have a new Maliki... And as a political strategy, it's genius: in a country as divided as Iraq, it's the only was to appeal to all the people."

Who is al-Maliki? In western parlance, it seems reasonable to describe him as a classic "politician."

In Iraq, after decades under Saddam Hussein, that may not be such a bad thing.

E-Day in Iraq

2010-03-01T11:25:00.001-05:00

My "Defense Statecraft" course requires that I post 5 times to the class blog over the semester. I'm going to use this assignment as a good excuse to get back to posting to this site. Here we go...

Tom Ricks’ perspective on Iraq’s future is enough to make anyone need a Prozac. As he noted in his recent lecture at the University of Kentucky, none of the major issues underlying tensions in Iraq have been resolved. There is no oil law. There is a scary sectarianism that threatens to tear apart a very fragile societal fabric. In his perspective, the upcoming (March 7, 2010) Iraqi elections are possibly the catalyst that will undo whatever “progress” the U.S. has made over the last few years. What’s more, in his mind, if Iraq’s major problems are not solved (and he thinks they won’t be) AND the U.S. pulls its troops out on schedule, Iraq is likely in for a civil war that could spawn a regional bloodbath. Goodbye “stable” functioning Iraqi democracy, hello massive death tolls and---- $10.00 gasoline----- and (maybe just maybe) a new Great Depression.

Need that Prozac?

There is no question that Ricks’ ideas should be taken very, very, seriously (also see his blog). Few people have his level of experience, access, and insight. However, there are reasons to give your psychiatrist pause over his prescription pad.

For example, Mr. Ricks, to his extreme credit, recently had Nir Rosen write a guest post for his blog on ForeignPolicy.com. Mr. Rosen paints a considerably rosier picture of Iraq. In his post, Rosen notes that he has little to no use for the hysterics in the international media (or lack of) about an unraveling in Iraq. After an extended stay in Iraq, in which he traveled widely and (ohmygawd!) at night, Mr. Rosen returned and could only complain about his time spent in traffic. In his estimation, Iraqis appear to have no stomach for sectarianism or hyper religious political parties. Critically (and interestingly), he found widespread support and praise for the Iraqi Security Forces among the Iraqi populace no matter how far flung or “shitty” the village he traveled to.

Besides Mr. Rosen’s anecdotes, there are other bits of evidence that, together, begin to make a compelling case against medicating yourself over Iraq’s problems. The New York Times recently published a series of fascinating reports about Iraqi grassroots democracy. One piece reported a political debate held in an East Baghdad barber shop. The folks inside (Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd, mind you) were debating exactly how George W. Bush should be remembered. They went on to bicker over who is best suited to be the next Prime Minister. No consensus emerged, but one fellow insisted it should be Ahmed Chalabi because he wanted someone with a strong grasp of economics.

Another piece reported that political campaign classes have sprouted up across the country to teach people the basics of running a campaign. The report suggests that up to 40% of the candidates registered for the upcoming elections have participated. Amusingly, most candidates are having a hard time grasping the unpleasantness of mudslinging.

They’ll understand when they’re (democratically) older.

Clearly these points are mere anecdotes. However, they each (and many others like them) convey the sense that Iraqis want change they can believe in. As Tom Friedman recently noted, time will tell if the Iraqis can surprise us. My money says these folks are headed for a brighter future than Tom Ricks believes. The upcoming elections are nothing to fear.

Hold the Prozac.

A fool's hope--- dashed?

2009-06-28T18:50:00.003-04:00

Though the focus of the blog has expanded somewhat, the country of Somalia will still receive considerable attention in this space. Today is no different. I’ve decided that it is entirely appropriate to give a brief update on the situation in Somalia since last I wrote.

When last I wrote about Somalia, the new President, Sharif Ahmed was inspiring at least a fool’s hope that he would be able to bring a small amount of stability to the war ravaged country. After all, he is a strong Islamist who has the gumption to believe that he can have good ties with the west. Of course, terrorists (al Shabaab) and pirates were running loose in his country, but, all in all, a fool was allowed to hope.

A fool indeed.

Two months later the President controls even fewer blocks of Mogadishu than he did previously. Al Shabaab (AS) has pressed further into the capital city and is imposing a kind of Islamic law that could warm only Osama bin Laden’s heart. Several teenage boys have had both a hand and foot amputated for stealing (a couple of cell phones, no less). A Somali MP and a government minister have been executed. Hundreds of civilians have died in the last two months alone and some reports suggest that nearly 200,000 people have been displaced in Mogadishu alone since May.

Mr. Ahmed’s government seems on the brink of collapse (see this video for a stirring report). He desperately needs the world community to provide him with some kind of aid, yet, he finds himself with few friends and fewer dollars (I imagine pesos might be quite helpful at this point). US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has recently authorized the transition of 10 million dollars worth of weapons to aid Mr. Ahmed, but it seems a bit late in the game (a day late and a dollar short to put it mildly).

It seems to me that it would be in the world’s profound interest to find a way to finally put an end to the suffering in this country, but few have the will or dollars to do so. Yet, regardless of political spine, a slew of recent reports suggest that al Qaeda has finally begun to have some on the ground operations in Somalia (even two months ago such reports seemed dubious).

It’s time for the world to wake up and smell the jihad.

A new focus

2009-06-23T09:38:00.002-04:00

As you can see from the title change of my blog, I am expanding the focus of my blog a bit. Previously I had been focused exclusively on the country of Somalia (a very worthy focus, I might add). However, as I have taken some time off, I've come to the conclusion that I want a bit more to write about and focus on. As a result, I've decided to expand the reach of my blog to the overall (old) US CENTCOM region. I have decided to focus on the old CENTCOM variant (as opposed to the newer shrunken CENTCOM) because the old CENTCOM still includes Somalia and surrounding countries (While the new CENTOM does not).

I hope to get back to my old schedule of writing a post once a week. I should get back at it this weekend.

Looking forward to it!

Somalia: Between Jihad and Restoration (Book Review)

2009-04-19T17:44:00.007-04:00

For the next several weeks the focus of this blog will be the book "Somalia: Between Jihad and Restoration." I picked up this book a week or so ago from Amazon. I purchased it primarily because it's the most recent Somalia related book available (so far as the all knowing Amazon could tell). There were several other books I wanted to pick up (and one I plan to read next), but most were written in the early part of this decade, long before any of the events we've been discussing.

The author of the book is a fellow named Shaul Shay, according to Amazon he's "a senior research fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel, and heads the Israel Defense Forces Department of History. An expert on international and Fundamentalist Islam terrorism, he has published studies and articles in Israel and abroad as well as a number of books on the subject."

As noted, I plan to spend the next few weeks reviewing his book. I suspect I'll take it a chapter at a time.

Also, as a side note, last week Sarai asked me to touch on the subject of US interests in Somalia, and the degree to which we send aid (or should send aid) to the country. I suspect this book will give us a useful treatment of just that issue.

Without further ado, let us dig in.

Chapter 1: Somalia background and historical review.

Chapter 1 provides us with a brief overview of the history of the Republic of Somalia (ROS). Though this blog tends to focus on Somalia post 1991, Shay's book places us back in 1960, at the outset of the ROS.

The ROS, according to Shay, was founded in 1960 as something of a merger between two former colonies---one British, one Italian. The general populace of the country is and was Sunni Muslim. Importantly, the populace can also be broken down into 4 clans: Dir, Isaaq, Darood, and the Hawiye. These clans tend to compete with one another, but Islam is most certainly something they all have in common. Of further interest, some 80% of Somalia was nomadic.

Upon its founding, the ROS was a surprisingly liberal country. The form of government was a very western style Parliament. Women could even vote (as of 1963).

This happy story ended in 1969 when General Zaid Barre overthrew the elected government with the intent of setting up a Marxist style government (which was fashionable at the time). Of course, Somalia actually got a dictatorship (potato-potato, if you get my drift).

As might be expected, Mr. Barre allied himself with the Soviets and was handsomely rewarded. His allies provided him with monetary, military, and diplomatic aid.

In 1977-78, Mr. Barre found himself at war with Ethiopia. He was defeated by the Ethiopians, which caused a massive influx of Somali's (who lived in Ethiopia) to flee home. (Mr. Shay suggests the number may have been a million!) Interestingly, for reasons that are not entirely clear to me, the Soviets actually supplied arms to both sides of the conflict!

The defeat in the war, coupled with the massive influx of people caused a considerable problem for Mr. Barre. As such, he appealed for international aid. Amusingly, the United States came to his aid in order to give the Soviets a headache.

Regardless of aid, the US seems to have given generously, the difficulty within Somalia created room for those in opposition to Mr. Barre to organize themselves. As might be expected, Mr. Barre was not amused by this development and moved to quash his opponents. Of course, he did so in a rather heavy handed manner (did you expect otherwise?). For roughly 7-8 years he went on a campaign of terror designed to annihilate his opponents. Yet, for all of his success, he managed to unite his enemies.

His government fell in 1991. Mr. Barre fled to Nigeria, where he died in 1995.

Out of Mr. Barre's demise came two individuals who would attempt to rule the country. Attempt being the operative word, as the actual outcome was civil war and mass death.

At some point I'd like to deal with these two fellows in more depth, but for now I'll just note that their names were Ali Mahdi Muhammad (AMH), and General Muhammad Farah Aidid (GA).

After the fall of Mr. Barre, Mr. AMH was quickly installed as the leader of Somalia. Though, this did not last long. Quickly thereafter Mr. GA won an intra-party election and beat Mr. AMH for the chairmanship of their party. He was thus "in charge." (as in previous posts, I'll use the words "in charge" with a certain grain of salt).

Mr. AMH did not go quietly. In fact, he didn't go at all. He refused to give up his post. Mr. GA did not take kindly to this development, and civil war quickly followed.

The war, combined with drought, and the failure of government services created a humanitarian disaster. At least 300,000 civilians died. Consequently, the United Nations (UN) authorized operation Restore Hope.

Sadly, both sides of the conflict recognized that control of food aid would boost their chances of ruling the country. As a result, both fought over who was in charge of distribution etc.

Mr. AMH was even said to have bombed various ports the contained UN aid because he was not in charge of distribution.

Ultimately, the United States decided to send a large contingent of troops to the country to help the starving....

I'll presume we all know how that ends.

Thus far, Mr. Shay provides us with a useful primer for understanding the basics of how Somalia got to where it is today. I'm looking forward to next week.

Somali Piracy

2009-04-12T17:24:00.014-04:00

On April 8, 2008 pirates off the coast of Somalia temporarily hijacked the American flagged vessel Maersk Alabama. Consequently, western media turned its attention toward the coast of the war-torn country for the first time in months (since the last major hijacking). While piracy off of Somalia may seem like something of a new phenomenon, the reality is that such piracy has been a problem for nearly a decade. Though, as noted in the graph above, piracy has spiked in the last two years. This post will attempt to briefly lay out who these pirates are, what there motives are, how they achieve their goals, and finally, the troubles they bring to their own shores.

Who are these guys?

Pirates appear to generally be based in or around the Puntland (see map above) port city of Eyl. Generally, they are gangs of men ages 20-35 who tend to belong to one of three groups:

Ex-fisherman: These guys are the brains of the operation. They know the water and how to command a vessel.

Militia: These guys are the brawn. They are trained in the use of their standard issue AK-47s and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).

Techies: These folks have a strong command of high tech equipment that other folks are generally lacking. They use the GPS, satellite phones, and all manner of other equipment.

Put these three groups together and you get a pretty talented bunch of pirates. Of further interest, very few (if any) of these folks seem to be tied to al-Shabaab (AS). Though, some reports suggest that AS may well collect some fees/taxes/bribes from pirates.

What are the motives?

From my perspective (and seemingly everyone else I read), Somali pirates are perhaps the most rational folks you'll meet. The average Somali makes about $600 per year (no word on standard deviation). Piracy, according to the BBC, raked in a cool $150 million dollars last year. The annual budget of Puntland is 20-30 million. In a country where half the population relies on food aid from the UN et al., pirates are known to roll through Eyl in Land Cruisers, marry the most beautiful women, dress in suits, and have 24 hours of electricity. Unless you're prone to sea sickness, I don't see the drawback, though see this story for a quick note about the dangers of piracy. Best not to pick on American ships, it would seem.

Tactics?

The difficulty with being a pirate, as you might imagine, is the piracy. How are a few guys with a motor boat supposed to hijack a super tanker carrying $100 million dollars worth of Saudi oil?

No other way to say it, these guys are good, and seem to have a good network in place for actually getting at their goals. In many cases (though certainlly not all), it seems as though pirates have contacts in other port cities in the region. If a ship seems a good mark, pirates are alerted. In many cases, the ships are tracked to a choke point known as the Gulf of Aden (see map above). When the moment is right, small (but powerful) boats are launched from larger "mother ships" (often old fishing boats, which have considerably longer range than the small boats alone) which carry about 7 -10 well armed (AK47s, RPGs, etc.). The pirates quickly toss (or shoot) grappling hooks onto the deck of the boats and climb aboard. From start to finish, the whole opperation can take as little as 15 minutes. Generally, the pirates opperate under cover of darkness, making them all the more difficult to stop.

Effects of Piracy

On the one hand, I imagine anyone can see that from the pirates point of view, piracy may be necessary for survival. The story most articles seem to carry portray Somalia's pirates as swashbuckling heroes (sans Johnny Depp). Yet, ultimately, for all the benefits piracy brings to the pirates themselves, they make life considerably more difficult for the average Somali. Recent reports noted that piracy has made it considerably more difficult for the World Food Program to ship food aid to the starving people of the country. According to Reuters news service, piracy has increased the cost of food deliveries by hundreds of millions of dollars. I've even seen some reports that the WFP may have to suspend some deliveries unless they can convince governments to keep escorting their aid ships. On a smaller scale, piracy also manages to make the cost of existing food skyrocket.

Resolutions?

No good ones, unfortunately. A number of outlets have tried their hand at offering advice. Some suggest creating "safe" shipping lanes for vessels in the region. Others suggest arming crew members. Ultimately, the only solution is in-country stability. Several reports note that the only time in the last decade when piracy vanished (though, I'm not certain of the absolute truth that it "vanished") was the 6 months in which the UIC was in charge of the country--- which suggests that piracy can be stopped (or slowed) with the right kind of leadership.

al-Shabaab

2009-04-05T20:34:00.004-04:00

We turn our attention now to al-Shabaab, the terror group that currently controls a considerable portion of southern Somalia. The current post will attempt to lay out the origins of al-Shabaab, its ideology and tactics (both military and populace control), members, and will close with a brief note about the current state of the group.

Origins

al-Shabaab (Arabic for “The Youth”) was originally formed as the armed wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), the group I wrote about last week. After the UIC was crushed by Ethiopia in late 2006 early 2007, al-Shabaab (AS) found itself similarly beaten back; they retreated into southern Somalia and attempted to regroup in the mangroves, marshes, and savannah. The remnants of the group quickly coalesced around two grizzled jihadists names, Adan Ayro and Hassan Turki. The group vowed to continue the fight against the invading Ethiopian army and the newly restored Transitional Federal Government (TFG). At this point, it is useful to point out that AS and the UIC were not necessarily always on the best of terms. Numerous reports suggest that the UIC was often embarrassed by the tactics of AS, and one reports by the Somaliland Times suggests that as early as August 2006 AS was threatening to break away from the UIC. Just how much friction there actually was between the two groups is up for interpretation. Now, as noted below, AS is currently at odds with the current government of President Sharif Ahmed (them former UIC head), which suggests that the two may not have always seen eye to eye.

Ideology and Tactics (military and civilian control)

It is no stretch to call AS an extreme Islamist group. Multiple reports have suggested that the group’s primary aim is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia which adheres to a very extreme version of Sharia Law. As one AS commander noted:

“As al-Shabab, we don't care about people who don't want Sharia law…Our goal is to have Sharia as the permanent law of our country, and to get the infidels out of our country, whether they are Ethiopians or Americans."

In order to obtain such goals, AS routinely attacks government forces as well as African Union peacekeepers and is very willing to resort to targeted assassinations and suicide bombings in order to get its political message across.

On the other hand, the group also attempts to sustain certain dominance over the Somali populace in general. It seems that AS wants to be the sole provider for and keeper of the populace. This is evidenced by the hundreds of dead aid workers, human rights campaigners, and (even a few) journalists AS has left in its wake. AS keeps the general populace in check by keeping a constant cloud of fear over the people; public floggings and the occasional beheading of suspected spies does the trick. Perhaps the most chilling story comes from a 25 year old woman interviewed by the BBC. She reported that a young relative of hers criticized AS policy regarding the closing of a cinema; here is her story of what happened next. Of course, al-Shabab soon came to look for him.

"There were many of them - they came to our house in two pick-up trucks…Then two of the men came and knocked on the door. I opened it - and they said, 'bring the boy out of the house.' "I said: 'The boy is not here'. They said: 'Bring him out.' I told them: 'He's not here.' Then they started kicking me, they kicked me to the ground. Then they started shooting. They shot me three times in the legs - one into my right leg then two into my left. It was terrible, my mother was in the house and she shouted: 'Why are you shooting my girl?'. They started beating her. They threw my mother on the ground and they kicked her."

As might be expected, AS has little room for dissent.

Members

As noted, the original leadership of AS consisted of Mr. Aryo and Mr. Turki. The overall leadership of the group has changed somewhat over time. Mr. Aryo was killed by an American AC 130 gunship as he met with other AS members in a safe house roughly a year ago. Mr. Turki is still about, though reports of his activity in the group vary. Some reports suggest he remains a leader in the group, while others suggest he heads up his own group which is merely affiliated with AS. Regardless, he remains a pivotal figure in the overall Somali insurgency.

These days, leadership of AS seems to sit with a panel of individuals “nominally led” by a Mohamed Mukhtar Abdirahman (i.e. Abu Zubeyr). The name Mukhtar Robow (i.e. Abu Mansur) has also surfaced a number of times. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFC) notes that he is the AS spokesman and may well be in command of AS units in the Bay and Bokool regions. The CFC also notes that Mr. Turki controls another region of Somalia with his group. The commanders of the remaining regions of Somalia are noted by the CFC.

The rank and file grunts of the AS are generally ordinary Somalis attempting to make a living for themselves. Numerous reports suggest that the average AS members is no Jihadist. In fact, a number of reports suggest that most Somalis are moderate and even Sufi Muslims. However, AS pays a hefty sum (upwards of $100 a month salary with benefits, such as they are) to fighters. In a region which has had no central government for nearly two decades, such a sum is likely very difficult to pass up.

Current State of AS

At current, AS has grown from a seeming rag-tag group of a few hundred, into a considerable force which may number in the thousands. The group is supplied by a number of sources. Monetarily speaking, the group manages obtain bribes from the air ports, sea ports, factories, etc. and it installs its members into cities where there is money to be made and puts them to work. Some reports also suggest that AS may get a certain percentage of the ransom from the ubiquitous Somali pirates. The Economist notes that wealthy Arab donors also make contributions.

Disturbingly, a number of sources have noted that AS manages to procure weapons from a wide array of sources, not least of which is directly from the Eritrean government. Though, it seems very reasonable to suggest that they likely don’t need the help. If anyone knows the story of Viktor Bout, this should seem obvious (if not, do “google” him).

In closing, AS has consolidated its power and is now poised to make considerable trouble for the new President of Somalia, Sharif Ahmed. The group is tough and organized, and even appears to have the support (if only in words) of one Osama bin Laden.

Mercifully, there are some reports that the AS may have a few troubles of its own. Reports notes that AS has so infuriated the Somali populace with its heavy handed approach that they may well have to face the wrath of an angry citizenry. Further, the group appears to have some division amongst its own leaders and ranks.

Perhaps this is a crack of daylight Mr. Ahmed can exploit.

The following sources were instrumental in constructing this post.

Stratfor
BBC
The Economist
Somaliland Times
Council on Foreign Relations

The Union of Islamic Courts

2009-03-29T10:24:00.002-04:00

Last week I finished my column by suggesting that I was going to focus on al-Shabaab next. I have decided to amend myself and instead focus on the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), the precursor to the Shabaab. As a result, our discussion of al-Shabaab will be delayed until next week. My apologies. I have a few other things to note about this entry. This entry will likely present conflicting reports about a number of matters. Frankly, the data I have reviewed has been disjointed and a bit murky. As a result, I want to note that there are several matters that I have yet to resolve for myself. I’ll try and note them as I go.

Following the demise of the Somali government in 1991, there have been a series of 14 separate governments that have attempted to restore some semblance of order to the country. Clearly, with that kind of turnover, stability is essentially impossible. Out of this governmental cesspool arose a certain popular movement of Islamic Courts which attempted to restore some kind of order. These groups were generally unaffiliated and presided over their own regions. As might be expected, reports indicate that some of these courts were quite radical, while others were rather moderate. These groups were somewhat successful in restoring a degree of order.

It is at this point that reports begin to conflict.

Some resources indicate that the courts first united (becoming the Union of Islamic Courts, UIC) in the year 2000 and became quite powerful. Some reports claim that the courts came to control most of Southern Somalia (below the Puntland) between 2000 and 2006. Other reports seem to indicate that they really were not much until 2006. I’ll need to pry into this matter a bit more. One bit of indirect evidence for the possibility that the UIC was not a particularly powerful group comes from a report by Congressional Research Service (CRS) which notes that peace conferences where held in the years 2000, 2002, 2003, and 2004. There is no mention that the UIC was invited to the conferences, which seems strange to me if in fact this group controlled the better part of the country. Though, the CRS does note that many delegations from many groups attended. It seems possible that the UIC was there, but again, there is no real mention of them. Also, the CRS suggests that the UIC didn’t emerge until 2006. Though, the language they use suggests to me that the UIC didn’t emerge as a power until 2006.

Again, this is “clearly murky.”

At this point, one might reasonably ask, “where was Sharif Ahmed” during all of this. Mr. Ahmed, now the President of Somalia (see last week’s entry), seems to have first made a name for himself in 2002. At the time, Mr. Ahmed lived about 90 km northeast of Mogadishu. He became the leader of an Islamic Court in the town of Jowhar. Mr. Ahmed, though, was driven from the area when a local warlord began to make trouble. He found himself teaching geography in Mogadishu the next year. Of course, we know what happened from there.

In 2004, Mr. Ahmed found himself as the chairman of the UIC. Over time, his group became considerably more powerful, and in mid-2006, his group took Mogadishu from the Transitional Somali government and local warlords. The group then quickly expanded its power and even re-opened the airport (closed for over a decade). The UIC was considerably successful in restoring some order to Mogadishu and even cleaned up the streets (literally, as refuse was cleared away for the first time in years).

To this point in my entry, one might be under the impression that the UIC was the best thing that had happened to Somalia in quite some time. It is at this point, again, that we see some very conflicting reports.

On the one hand, a number of reports claim that the UIC was a radical Islamist group. Some reports suggest that they closed movie theaters, banned the viewing of soccer on TV, prohibited women from working, and perhaps worst of all (from a US point of view) harbored al-Qaeda terrorists. On the other hand, the CRS reports the following:

"Some of these measures were taken by the Courts, although for different reasons and not because of the Courts’ alleged jihadist and extremist ideology. For example, movies were banned in the morning in response to requests from parents because Somali children were going to movies in the morning instead of school. The ban on television did not take place, except for restrictions on watching soccer games late at night, according to Islamic Courts officials and Somali residents in Mogadishu. This measure was reportedly taken because of disturbances and fighting late at night. There is no evidence to support the allegation that women were prohibited from working."

The author of the report claims that he based this section of the report on “over 25 conversations between July 2006 and March 2007 with senior Islamic Courts officials and Somali residents in Mogadishu.”

At current, I cannot determine whether the UIC was, in fact, an extremist Islamic group or merely a group of folks of the Islamic faith who were given a bad wrap. Further research is needed on this matter. Though, for the moment, it seems reasonable to suggest that both claims likely have some truth to them. We have already established that Mr. Ahmed is and was something of a moderate. Yet, there were clearly others in the UIC who were not. One element of the UIC that was seemingly quite radical was the military wing of the group, known as al-Shabaab.

Given the degree of instability in the nation, it seems reasonable to me to suggest that some elements of the UIC may well have been highly radical, while others were very reasonable. This is still open to debate.

In any event, in late 2006, the UIC found itself in a fight with the forces of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopia (both, it would seem, backed by the US). The UIC was routed with relative ease and fled to the southernmost portion of Somalia.

In the aftermath of the ousting of the UIC, Mr. Ahmed surrendered to Kenyan forces. Though, he was only held for a day. He later met with the US ambassador to Kenya.

Of further critical interest, the Shabaab was shredded by US and Ethiopian guns, but has regrouped of late… and are poised to cause trouble for their former boss.

The following sources were instrumental in the creation of this post:

The Economist
The Council on Foreign Relations
The Congressional Research Service
Somalinet
Center for Strategic International Studies

2009-03-22T15:30:00.001-04:00

google5bb16cae715384d4.html

President Sharif Ahmed

2009-03-22T12:40:00.001-04:00

Mildly stated, Somalia is a failed state. It has had no functioning government since 1991. Somalia is so dysfunctional that a recent LA Times article noted, it is the place where “US foreign policy goes to die.” Currently, Somalia is overrun with warlords, terror groups, and terrified civilians. To attempt to get a good grasp of the country is exceedingly difficult. In fact, as a recent issue of The Economist noted “We currently know less about the country than at any time in the last 100 years.” Of course, the reason so little is know is that it’s simply to dangerous to be a reporter in Mogadishu (the capital city). Tragically, even some diplomats who work on Somalia have never visited.

Given these difficulties, where should a novice blogger begin? There are many reasonable starting points, but it seems useful to begin with Somalia’s key players. Once we have even a bare bones sense of who is in charge (a term I use very lightly), or who is trying to be in charge, perhaps we can expand our understanding upon a base of who is who. As such, I am going to spend this first blog entry trying to give a brief primer on the new moderate Somali president, Mr. Sharif Ahmed (see photo above. Photo can be found at http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13185216&fsrc=rss).

Sharif Ahmed, 44, a former geography teacher, is now is the man “in charge” of Somalia.
Mr. Ahmed’s path to the Presidency is both interesting and unlikely. Born July 25, 1964, grew up in Somalia and was later educated in the Sudan (where he majored in Arabic and Geography. Though, some outlets suggest he minored in Geography).

Multiple news outlets note that sometime between 2002 and 2003 Mr. Ahmed was a Geography teacher in the Somali Capital of Mogadishu. During this time, armed bandits brought considerable violence to the capital (though, this was likely not unusual) as the official government had little to no control over the country. One of Mr. Ahmed’s students was kidnapped and held for a considerable ransom. It was this incident that drove Mr. Ahmed to campaign for an Islamic (Sharia) court (one much like a court he had been a part of before his move to Mogadishu several years earlier) to help restore order. Such a court was quickly formed and Mr. Ahmed was elected its chair.

According to the BBC, Mr. Ahmed, a presumed moderate, then helped unite several other similar Islamic courts. Mr. Ahmed was also elected chair of this new United Islamic Court (UIC). The UIC brought some relative calm to the capital (of course, there was wrangling amongst the moderates and hardliners of the group), though, the calm lasted only a brief 6 months.

Mr. Ahmed’s UIC was quickly ousted from power by an Ethiopian invasion (supported and aided by the US). The Ethiopian invasion was mounted, ostensibly, to restore the official Somali government to power, to avoid letting Somalia declare an Islamic Republic, and to avoid letting Somalia fall into the hands of al-Qaeda.

Mr. Ahmed found this rationale preposterous. In an interview with Der Spiegel, he stated unequivocally that “That was a weak pretense which only complicated the situation even further. We never intended to declare an Islamic republic… I was, and still am today, strictly against giving asylum in Somalia to al-Qaida criminals and their kind.”

Ultimately, the Ethiopian invasion largely succeeded, but found itself in something of a quagmire. After several years of fighting in Somalia, Ethiopian forces began to withdraw in early 2009. As a result, the transitional government, which was propped up by Ethiopia, resigned, paving the way for new elections. The Somali parliament elected Mr. Ahmed President just a short two months ago. The results of this election appear to please US policy makers as Mr. Ahmed is generally thought of as a pretty moderate fellow (at least relative to the rest of the UIC).

Mr. Ahmed now finds himself in an extremely difficult position. His government has no budget, few foreign friends, and a parliament that does not even meet in country (in meets in a posh Djibouti hotel).

To make matters worse, the hardliners and armed wing of his original UIC have regrouped and now appear poised to make considerable trouble for Mr. Ahmed. This new group, known as al-Shabab, has been arming themselves, training thousands of recruits, and attempting to ally themselves with al-Qaeda.

We turn to them next Sunday.

This entry was aided by the following resources:

http://www.economist.com/
http://somalinet.com/news/world/English/2882
http://www.latimes.com/
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,519776,00.html
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5072268.stm

The point.

2009-03-20T16:41:00.000-04:00

Hello, and welcome to my blog. As indicated by the name, this blog will generally focus on the war-torn country of Somalia. Before we get started I should make a few points about myself. First, I have no special insights or knowledge of Somalia. I am merely a graduate student with to much (not enough??!!) time on his hands. I started this blog because I have a certain fascination with foreign policy and because --frankly, as far as I can tell, there is a shortage of news coverage of Somalia. As I noted, I have no real Somalia expertise, rather, through the process of writing this blog I hope to obtain a certain lay-expertise.

Going forward I should note that I plan to update this blog once a week, likely on Sunday afternoons. I imagine that most posts will likely be little more than regurgitation of what various news outlets have already covered. Hopefully I can find some common themes and help us all get to know this pivotal (but obscure) country a little better.

Look forward to writing more,
David